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A B S T R A C T
Formal financial institutions inadequately distribute startup capital to business ventures of ethnic minorities,
women, low-educated, and young people. Self-financing groups fill this gap because in these associations agents
accumulate their savings into a fund that is later used to provide loans to the members. This study builds and
simulates an agent-based model that compares the profitability of businesses started by members of self-fi-
nancing groups against businesses financed by commercial loans. The results indicate that—besides the self-
generation of debt capital—businesses of members of self-financing groups can have higher returns due to the
consolidation of social capital and the competitive advantage created through a dual process of homophily.
Higher quotas of savings boost profits, but only up to a threshold, after which a bifurcation pattern—typical of
complexity dynamics—emerges. The practical and theoretical implications of the findings are discussed and
future research lines are proposed.
1. Introduction
Small businesses have a cumulative economic impact on the
economy due to their relevance for long-term economic growth, pro-
ductivity and job creation—see Acs and Armington (2006) or
Haltiwanger, Jarmin, Kulick, and Miranda (2016). In Sub-Saharan
Africa for example, micro-enterprises employ an estimated 80% of the
working population (Biekpe, 2004), while in Colombia small business
represent 96% of the enterprises created annually (Santana, 2017).
Despite their remarkable relevance, Cheng (2015) and Berger and
Udell (2006) note that the financing of small startups is limited by the
informational opacity that hinders banks from assessing the profit-
ability, survivability and financial credibility of small ventures. More-
over, ethnic minorities, women, low-educated and young people are
disproportionately impacted by the difficulties in accessing financial
resources for business startups, even in developed countries1.
The limitations in business financing can be overcome through
government grants and subsidized loans. Due to the high cost of these
policies, disadvantaged groups also rely on emerging financing instru-
ments such as loan guarantees, microcredits, crowd-funding, peer-to-
peer lending and business angel investment (OECD, 2014). One addi-
tional financing option for entrepreneurs who want to start their own
business is self-financing groups.
Self-financing groups are a form of community-based associations
that act as small savings and loan cooperatives of individuals (Greaney,
Kaboski, & Van Leemput, 2016). In a self-financing group, members
agree to periodically provide an individual quota of savings with the
aim of creating a collective pecuniary fund. The contribution is pro-
vided in group meetings during the life-cycle of a group. The fund of
savings accumulated during the meetings is used for internal loan
provision to the members.
Following Atlan (1991), self-financing groups can be conceptualized
as a phenomenon of contextual complexity. Contextual complexity
emerges from the communication among heterogeneous agents and the
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interaction of their goals. This pattern is typical of self-financing
groups, because in these associations heterogeneous members with
bounded rationality actively interact with each other over time, pur-
suing both personal and group-level goals, before and after a startup
venture.
Due to its versatility, agent-based modeling is a computational ap-
proach suitable to capture the contextual complexity of self-financing
groups. Members of self-financing groups face budget constraints and
can exhibit random behavior, limiting the applicability of the tradi-
tional paradigm of a representative, perfectly rational utility-max-
imizing agent (Farmer, Patelli, & Zovko, 2005). In an agent-based
model of autonomous and non-homogeneous agents, as the one de-
scribed in Macal and North (2010), rational effects are dominated by
stochastic fluctuations, and emerging social and financial patterns arise
from the interaction between the behavioral and strategic decisions of
heterogeneous agents with bounded rationality (Ponta & Cincotti,
2018).
In the agent-based model herein, agents decide to join a self-fi-
nancing group due to intra-household conflicts, homophily and lack of
access to formal financial loans. The members of the group are selected
by an autonomous agent, who optimizes a gender-composition criterion
(i.e., a preference for women members). Default rates are a function of
the individual behavior of agents and the interaction among agents.
Homophily enables the creation of social capital among members,
which is aggregated to the debt capital generated by the group to start
up a business. The sequential simulation of the algorithms produces a
complex system in which patterns emerge from the interaction of agents
at the micro level (Pyka, Mueller, & Kudic, 2018).
The results of the computational experiments in this study indicate
that—due to homophily and embedded relational dynamics—funding
from self-financing groups can increase business profitability compared
to businesses financed through external loans, but only up to a bi-
furcation threshold. Self-financing groups build social capital that is
difficult to imitate, which contributes as an additional resource to the
success of a businesses initiative. However, after a threshold in the
savings quota, a bifurcation in profitability emerges as a consequence of
household budget constraints, the mimicking default behavior of
agents, and the high interest rates that self-financing groups tend to
charge for internal loans.
The findings of this study fill the research gap left by studies that
have been traditionally focused on formal financing of small businesses.
The impact of providing formal credit to small and micro business has
been largely studied by inter alia Tuyon, Mohammad, Junaidi, and Ali
(2011), Shahriar, Schwarz, and Newman (2016), Newman, Schwarz,
and Ahlstrom (2017), Evelyn and Osifo (2018) or Atmadja, Sharma, and
Su (2018)—see also the review of Chen, Chang, and Bruton (2017). The
conclusion of these studies is that formal financial institutions do not
properly provide seeding to entrepreneurship, see for example Field,
Pande, Papp, and Rigol (2013) or Nguimkeu (2014). By contrast, there
has been limited research on the impact of financing small business
through internal loans from self-financing groups, creating a research
gap that this study fills.
This study also contributes to the field of agent based modeling and
complexity in business by using homophily to extend the recent lit-
erature on strategic group formation. In strategic group formation,
agents maximize their individual utility by deciding to join or leave a
social group (Collins & Frydenlund, 2018). Under a resource-view ap-
proach, the maximization of utility in self-financing groups translates to
acquiring more resources in the form of loans and/or social capital. This
study argues that homophily plays an additional ancillary role in stra-
tegic group formation and can further promote business profitability up
to a bifurcation point.
The rest of the study is organized as follows: Section 2 offers a
conceptual overview of self-financing groups, agent-based modeling,
social capital and homophily. Section 3 describes the agent-based
model of self-financing businesses. Section 4 presents the results of
simulating the model through computational experiments. Section 5
concludes and discusses the practical and theoretical implications of the
findings. A replication package with MatLab codes and step-by-step




Self-financing groups are community-based organizations formed by
people related by affinities or a specific goal (Brody et al., 2015). The
participants of a self-financing group join together to achieve individual
and/or collective targets, which can be related to business startups,
investment, consumption-smoothing, asset acquisition or economic
empowerment. The members of the group achieve their objectives
through the accumulation of savings, the provision of internal credit
and the creation of an informal insurance fund.
The roots of self-financing groups can be traced back to two types of
indigenous associations: rotating savings and credit associations
(ROSCAs) and accumulating savings and credit associations (ASCRAs).
In ROSCAs, there is no loan provision because the pooled fund of sav-
ings is distributed to the members in a rotating pattern. In ASCRAs, the
savings are not instantly redistributed but are rather accumulated in
order to make loans with a fixed maturity (Bouman, 1995).
Self-financing groups are promoted by formal banks, the govern-
ment or non-governmental organizations, who develop their own group
schemes based on the principles of ROSCAs and ASCRAs. According to
le Polain, Sterck, and Nyssens (2018), the best-known facilitated self-
financing models are the village savings and loan association initiated by
CARE International, the savings and internal lending communities pro-
moted by Catholic Relief Services and the savings for changes model
promoted by Oxfam and Freedom from Hunger. In India, the National
Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development (NABARD) steered the
concept of self-help groups focused on the management of savings and
credit (Pillai & Abraham, 2017).
Biggart (2001) relates the existence of self-financing groups to five
situational circumstances: a communally-based social order, obligations
that are held to be collective in nature, social and economic stability,
social and economic isolation, and similarity between members. The
research evidence has also discussed the importance of self-financing
groups for capital accumulation (Alila, 1998), investment (Hospes,
1995), asset accumulation (Annan, Bundervoet, Seban, & Costigan,
2013), the promotion of income generating activities—Allen (2006),
Ksoll, Lilleør, Lønborg, and Rasmussen (2016) or Flynn and Sumberg
(2018)—and the generation of social capital (Ban, Gilligan, & Rieger,
2015).
Garikipati (2008) offers concrete examples about how self-financing
groups can increase trust, which is the basis for social capital. For ex-
ample, members of a self-financing group may help each other with
childcare and livestock care without an explicit payment, or may help
other members in finding waged work. Feigenberg, Field, Pande, Rigol,
and Sarkar (2014) provide experimental evidence that shows that
meetings of self-financing groups also aid to build social capital, mea-
sured by the number of times the members talk with each other about
businesses.
2.2. Social capital and homophily
Loury (1977) define social capital as naturally occurring social re-
lationships aimed at promoting valued skills. Bourdieu and Wacquant
2 The MatLab replication package is freely available at: https://nl.mathworks.
com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/73961-agent-based-model-of-nano-finance-
groups
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(1992) understand social capital as resources accruing from a durable
network, institutionalized through mutuality of acquaintance and re-
cognition. Cooke and Wills (1999) make an additional distinction be-
tween human capital and social capital: while both refer to acquired
skills, qualifications and capabilities, in social capital assets are less
capable of formal certification.
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) propose three facets of social capital:
structural, relational and cognitive. The structural dimension refers to
the degree of connectivity (the network) between agents. The relational
dimension—which is based on trust and trustworthiness (Fukuyama,
1995), identity and identification (Hakansson & Snehota, 1995)—is
based on the nature and characteristics of relationships, which can be
competitive or cooperative. The cognitive dimension is a shared cog-
nitive system of representations among agents, which can improve in-
terpersonal communication and enhance relationships between mem-
bers within an organization (see Jiang & Liu, 2015, page 130).
Edwards and Foley (1997) raise two additional issues in the study of
social capital: availability and equality. First, social capital is not
equally available to all individuals, because geographic and social iso-
lation limit the access to this resource. Second, not all social capital is
created equal: the value of a specific source of social capital depends on
the socioeconomic position of the individual within society. This in-
equality implies that agents will have heterogeneous levels of social
capital depending on their socioeconomic and geographical character-
istics (Hsung, Fu, & Lin, 2017).
Theoretically, the importance of social capital for businesses can be
seen from a resource-view approach if social capital is conceptualized
as a source of competitive advantage that adds value to a venture, as in
Jiang and Liu (2015). For instance, Bourdieu (1986) interprets social
capital as an aggregate of actual or potential resources, again linked by
a durable network of relationships, mutual acquaintances and re-
cognition. Lin (2001) likewise suggests that social capital consists of
resources embedded in social networks accessed and used by agents.
The resource-view approach to social capital has led Batjargal (2003)
to propose that heterogeneity in the structural, relational and resource-
based aspects of social capital is reflected in various aspects of business
performance. The agent-based model of this study is based on the premise
of Batjargal (2003): self-financing groups build social capital that is diffi-
cult to imitate and thus contribute as an additional resource to the success
of a business initiative. Through a process of homophily, embedded re-
lations—that improve coordination and reduce organizational con-
flict—influence purchase and sale decisions of entrepreneurs.
McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001) define homophily as the
principle that people tend to group with others who are like them.
According to Collins and Frydenlund (2018), the factors that determine
homophily include gender, religion, social class, education and other
intrapersonal or behavioral characteristics. Granovetter (1985) and
Jiang and Liu (2015) argue that intrapersonal and behavioral char-
acteristics of members of a group create dense ties that support stronger
reciprocity and greater trust. Social capital emerges from these dense
ties, which minimize monitoring and transaction costs by reducing
opportunistic behaviors (Uzzi, 1997).
2.3. Agent-based modeling
Agent-based modeling can be traced back to the developments of
complexity theory and artificial intelligence—see Weisbuch (1991),
Kauffman (1993), Order (1995), Langton (1997) or Macal and North
(2010). Complexity analyzes patterns and structures that emerge from
interactions (Kirman, 2010). Artificial intelligence, in turn, is a subfield
of computer science aimed at building agents that exhibit aspects of
intelligent behavior in terms of autonomy, social ability, reactivity and
pro-activeness (Wooldridge & Jennings, 1995). Based on the interac-
tions among intelligent agents, agent-based models produce insights
that guide decision-making, help to solve complex problems and si-
mulate real-life phenomena.
Hamill and Gilbert (2016) define an agent-based model as a com-
puter program that creates an artificial world of heterogeneous agents
and enables the investigation of their interactions. In this artificial
world, agents react to other agents, pursue goals, communicate with
other agents and move around within the environment (Wooldridge &
Jennings, 1995).
According to Macal and North (2010), an agent-based model has
three elements:
(i) A set of agents, with attributes and behaviors.
(ii) A set of agent relationships and methods of interaction, i.e. a to-
pology of connectedness that defines how and with whom agents
interact.
(iii) The environment. Besides interacting with other agents, agents can
in some cases also affect their environment.
Following Lemos (2017), an agent can be defined as a computer
system that is situated in some environment and is capable of per-
ceiving, deciding and performing actions in an autonomous way. For-
mally, let +E be the set of possible environment states, and let
+A be the set of actions available to , then the sequence of en-
vironment states alternating with actions of can be defined using the
run of simulations , where A is the subset of runs ending with an
action, and E the subset of runs ending with an environment
state. Based on the definitions above, an agent will be a function that
maps runs ending in environment states into actions: A: E (see
Wooldridge, 2009).
An agent-based topology defines how agents are connected to each
other. Typical topologies are cellular automata (Wolfram, 2018), the
Euclidean space, networks where nodes are the agents and the links are
relationships (El-Sayed, Scarborough, Seemann, & Galea, 2012), spatial
grids—based on a geographic information system (GIS)—and aspatial
topologies where agents have no location because it is not relevant for
the simulation at hand.
In some models, agents can also affect and modify their environ-
ment when the collective action of multiple agents causes changes in
the environmental state in which agents operate, thereby generating
the map A E. See inter alia Sengupta and Bennett (2003), who use
a model of agents distributed in a geographical environment to simulate
the ecological and economic impacts of agricultural policies.
Emerging patterns are also a characteristic of agent-based models.
As Macal and North (2010) highlight, both the heterogeneity of agents
and self-organization are features of agent-based simulation that allow
the emergence of complexity patterns. This emergence differentiates
agent-based models from other simulation techniques, such as discrete-
event simulation and system dynamics.
3. Agent-based model of self-financing businesses
Small businesses play an important role in economic growth and
socioeconomic development (Tuyon et al., 2011). Startup businesses
normally confront a shortage of capital and limited access to loans from
formal commercial banks and thus have to draw upon informal sources
of startup finance, such as micro-credits provided by formal finance
institutions or internal loans obtained from informal self-financing
groups.
The agent-based model of this study aims to simulate the profit-
ability of businesses financed by self-financing groups. The business
profitability of the self-financing group is compared to the profitability
of a counterfactual business financed with external loans from a formal
financial institution.
In the agent-based simulation of self-financing groups (henceforth,
ABS-SFG):
— The set of active agents are (i) women and men of the working
population in an artificial community, and (ii) an autonomous agent
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in charge of creating the self-financing group. Passive agents are
children and the elderly in the community, who do not make deci-
sions but influence the behavior of active agents.
— The topology is defined in the Euclidean space n, i.e. the set of all
real n-tuples = …p p p{( , , )| }n n j1 for a real number pj in = …j n1, 2, ,
(Abbena, Salamon, & Gray, 2017). The connectedness of the agent-
based model in the Euclidean two-dimensional space 2 is calcu-
lated using (i) the Euclidean distance between households and (ii)
the Euclidean distance between the intrinsic demographic char-
acteristics of individuals.
— The environment is defined only by the interaction of agents with
other agents. Agents cannot change their environment.
The computational ABS-SFG model is a multilayered simulation of
four algorithms that run sequentially in two phases (Fig. 1). The agent-
based simulation illustrated in Fig. 1 is a ‘microverse’ containing the
dynamics and environment of self-financing groups, as in Guterman,
Harmon, and Roiland (2015). The model creates an artificial world that
emulates the behavior of the members of self-financing groups in a
village, as in the second-order simulacra of Baudrillard (1994), who
inspired the simulated reality of Wachowski and Wachowski (1999).
The four stages of the ABS-SFG model can be grouped into an in-
itialization phase (Algorithms 1 and 2) and a running phase (Algorithms
3 and 4). In the first stage, the model starts simulating a community of
agents in an artificial village (Algorithm 1). In the second stage, a self-
financing group is formed by an agent that selects members from the
individuals in the artificial village who want to be part of the group
(Algorithm 2). In the third stage, heterogeneous agents in the self-fi-
nancing group interact with each other to accumulate social and debt
capital (Algorithm 3). In the last stage, an internal loan is provided to
agents for the creation of a business venture and the profitability of a
self-financing business is compared with the profitability of a counter-
factual business of non-members financed by a loan from a formal fi-
nancial institution (Algorithm 4).
Table 1 shows the submodels in the algorithms and lists the vari-
ables/traits included in each submodel. Table 1 also indicates which
equations are used to calculate the traits in each submodel and further
clarifies whether values are predetermined or produced by the model.
The next subsections describe in detail the equations and submodels in
each algorithm.
3.1. Algorithm 1: Artificial community
Box 1 shows the first algorithm of the simulation model. Based on the
number of households (H), random numbers from probability distributions
are used to create an artificial community of agents that have three de-
mographic characteristics: age (a), gender (g), and the number of depen-
dent individuals in the household (i.e. children and the elderly, h).
The h-households in the village ( = …h H1, 2, , ) are populated with
i-individuals based on the numerical values of a centered probability











The stochastic function in Eq. (1) was chosen to populate the
households following Jennings, Lloyd-Smith, and Ironmonger (1999)
and Jennings and Lloyd-Smith (2015), who show that a Poisson process
is suitable for modeling household size distribution. The number of
productive individuals in the household ( h) is obtained from random
numbers of a discrete uniform distribution (Eq. (2)), while the gender of
Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the agent-based model of self-financing groups (adapted from Rebaudo et al. (2011)). The figure illustrates the multilayered
structure of the ABS-SFG model: SFG dynamics and business performance are the result of the interaction between external factors—the macroeconomic environment
and the facilitation mechanisms of development agencies—plus the internal behavior of the individuals in the artificial community and the members of the self-
financing group. The model is a sequence of four algorithms: Algorithm 1 randomly creates an artificial population inhabiting households in a village: working-age
women, working-age men and household dependents (children and the elderly). Based on socioeconomic characteristics, homophily and intra-household conflict,
some individuals of the working-age population want to join the SFG. In Algorithm 2, an agent hired by a development agency (the field officer) forms a SFG by
choosing members from the individuals that want to be part of the SFG. Member selection is based on a gender rule (a preference for women). Algorithm 3 simulates
the dynamics of the self-financing group: members allocate their savings into a common fund in each meeting and then take a joint loan from the accumulated fund.
Social capital is created through homophily as the result of participating in the SFG. Algorithm 4 simulates the financial performance of a business started by the SFG
members that do not fail to contribute with their savings. The performance of the business of the SFG is compared with the performance of a counterfactual business
financed by a loan obtained from a formal financial institution.
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each individual (gi) is obtained from numerical values of a conditional
uniform discrete distribution (Eq. (3)):
u~ (1, )h (2)
=g u u u| ~ (1, ), 2 .i h g g, , (3)
The age of each i-individual (ai) is produced from a mixture of
discrete uniform distributions:













The income (yi) of the working population in the village is generated
Table 1
Structure of the agent-based simulation of self-financing businesses (ABS-SFG)
Phase/algorithm Variables/traits in each submodel Equations
Initialization
Algorithm 1: Generation of an artificial community
Households ° Family size Centered Poisson distribution (Eq. (1))
° Intra-household productive individuals Uniform discrete distribution (Eq. (2))
° Intra-household gender composition Uniform discrete distribution (Eq. (3))
Village (community) • Number of households in the village None (initialization parameter)
° Age profile in the village Mixture of uniform distributions (Eq. (4))
° Income profile in the village Log-normal distribution (Eq. (5))
Algorithm 2: Formation of a self-financing group (SFG)
Agents that want to join the SFG ° Probability of joining a SFG Mixture of probabilities (Eq. (6))
° Social bonds (homophily) Sigmoid function (Eq. (7))
° Geographical distance (homophily) Sigmoid function (Eq. (8))
° Intra-household conflicts Sigmoid function (Eq. (9))
° Lack of access to financial services Sigmoid function (Eq. (10))
Field officer (agent) ° Gender ratio of women in the SFG Conditional function (Eq. (11))
Running phase
Algorithm 3: SFG dynamics of savings accumulation and formation of social capital
Savings allocation across meetings ° Probability of not contributing with savings Stochastic inequality (Eq. (12))
° Group-level probability of default in savings Hyperbolic tangent (Eq. (13))
• Amount of savings quota of each member None (simulation parameter)
• Mimicking behavior None (simulation parameter)
Members of the SFG (agents) ° Idiosyncratic probability of default in savings Mixture of probabilities (Eq. (14))
° Income of SFG members Sigmoid function (Eq. (15))
° Age of SFG members Sigmoid function (Eq. (16))
• Gender risk of not contributing to the SFG None (simulation parameter)
Savings accumulation ° Savings accumulation in the common box Accumulation of contributions (Eq. (17))
° Adaptative rule in the case of default Stochastic addition of savings (Eq. (18))
• Threshold of SFG failure None (simulation parameter)
Social capital ° Social capital (function of homophily) Homophily among members (Eq. (19))
° Impact of participating in SFG Scale factor (Eq. (20))
° Age differences among members Inverse Euclidean distance (Eq. (21))
° Income differences among members Inverse Euclidean distance (Eq. (22))
° Household distance among members Euclidean distance (Eq. (23))
Algorithm 4: Loan provision and business simulation
Loan allocation ° Probability of receiving a loan Social capital and income (Eq. (24))
• Risk aversion (ex ante) None (simulation parameter)
° Risk aversion (ex post) Updated risk aversion (Eq. (25))
° Amount of the loan allocated to borrowers Fraction of total savings in the box (Eq. (26))
° Effective interest rate charged to loans Interest rate plus risk aversion (Eq. (27))
Business performance • Fraction of assets allocated to inventory None (simulation parameter)
• Impact of the macroeconomic environment None (simulation parameter)
° Total amount of debt (principal + interest) Debt function (Eq. (28))
° Inventory Initial inventory (Eq. (29))
° Retail sales Income gained from sales (Eq. (30))
° Cash flow Income flow minus loan repayments (Eq. (31))
° Utility (returns) Returns minus random expenses (Eq. (32))
° Average assets Assets over the period (Eq. (33))
° Returns on assets (ROA) Returns divided by average assets (Eq. (34))
° Market sales Function of social capital (Eq. (35))
Notes on simulation values.
(•) Predetermined.
(°) Produced by the model.
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using random numbers from a log-normal distribution:
=f y µ
y











where g w gw{ , } is a gender index for women (w) and men ( gw),
under the assumption that men in the population have (on average)
higher income than women ( >¬µ µw w) and less dispersion around the
average income ( <¬w w). The stochastic function for income was
chosen as log-normal because although income follows a Pareto law in
the upper tail, the distribution of the low-income population is nor-
mally described with a log-normal distribution; see for example Souma
(2001) or Banerjee, Yakovenko, and Di Matteo (2006). The assumption
about the difference of the distribution of income for women is based
on evidence about the polarization of women’s employment and in-
come, which has been related to occupational segregation, dis-
crimination, work-life balance, part-time work, career patterns across
the life cycle and labor mobility—see Hakim (2016).
The first stage of the simulation produces a population matrix P i
with the following agent’s characteristics: household location (h) of
agents, identification of individuals (ih) in the population, gender (gi),
number of dependents in a household ( h), age of the agents (ai) and
income (yi). See Box 1 below.
3.2. Algorithm 2: Formation of a self-financing group
In the second algorithm, an autonomous field agent f creates a
self-financing group by selecting members from the subset of the in-
dividuals P i of the population P i who want to join the group
(P Pi i). Due to the probabilistic nature of the agent’s wish to join a
SFG—and due to the optimization decision of the autonomous field
agent when deciding on gender composition—the m-number of mem-
bers of a self-financing group is not programmed in the model, but is
rather one of the emerging patterns produced by the model.
Following the theory of strategic group formation (Collins &
Frydenlund, 2018), agents join or leave a group in order to gather social
and financial resources. Besides this utility maximizing behavior,
homophily plays a role in the formation of self-financing groups. In the
ABS-SFG model, the probability m( )i of i-agents wishing to join a self-
financing group is a quadratic mixture of the probabilities related to
their lack of financial access ( fi
a), the geographical proximity among
households in the village ( i
h), the social connections among productive
individuals (si), and intra-household conflicts (hic):













f( ) 1 1
1i
a







h h1 ( ( ) )i










i1 h p, (10)
In Eq. (6), m( )i is the weight—the importance—that individuals assign
to lack of formal financial access, f( )i
a . Lack of financial access in Eq.
(7) is based on the probabilistic transformation of the income of each
individual in a household (yh i, ). Demirgüç-Kunt, Beck, and Honohan
(2008) argue that cost-effective micro-financial services are not avail-
able to the extreme poor due to the imbalance between the fixed
transactions costs of formal financial institutions and the small trans-
actions and low demand of the extreme poor, which cannot be com-
pensated with higher interest rates. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) add that,
in the presence of imperfect and costly information, the expected rate of
return of banks increases less rapidly than the interest rate and, beyond
a point, may actually decrease, thus generating a credit-rationing effect
in formal banking. Hence, the low income of the agents in a village
reduces the probability of having access to a formal loan from a fi-
nancial institution.
Homophily is implemented through the sigmoid functions (8) and
(9), which transform to probabilities the geographical proximity of
households (Eq. (8)), as well as the connections among productive in-
dividuals (Eq. (9)). Homophily plays a dual role in self-financing
groups: during group formation and during the life-cycle of the group.
During group formation, homophily interacts with the utility max-
imization behavior of agents who seek resource acquisition, because
self-financing groups are generally formed by peers who share similar
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. During the life-cycle of
the group, homophily consolidates social capital and reduces the risk
aversion among agents.
In order to measure the probability of joining a group based on
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geographical homophily, the Euclidean distance between agent’s
households (dh) is given by =d h h( ( ) )i i
N
i
2 1, and this distance
is converted to a probability measure through the sigmoid function of
Eq. (8), which assigns more homophily to individuals living in house-
holds near the center of the village. The probability of joining a group
due to social homophily in Eq. (9) is based on the probabilistic trans-
formation of the number of productive individuals in a household (ih p, ).
Households with a large number of productive individuals have more
social connections with other productive agents, and thus have a higher
probability of joining a self-financing group.
Finally, intra-household conflicts (Eq. (10)) are measured by the
number of dependents in a household ( ¬ih p, ), since a large number of
dependent children and retired elderly can lead to higher intra-house-
hold conflicts among productive members in relation to investment
decisions, and thus can increase the probability of agents joining self-
financing groups. Conflictual interactions within a household has been
put forward by Anderson and Baland (2002) as one of the main reasons
to join self-financed groups when there are asymmetric preferences
between men and women about investment in household goods.
The set of members that want to be part of the self-financing group
(P i) is obtained with a rejection sampling algorithm in which the
candidates are agents P i for which the mixture probability m( )i in Eq.
(6) is higher than a random number u ~ (0, 1)m , where (·) is a
standard continuous uniform distribution.
The autonomous field agent f selects the i members of the self-
financing group from the set of individuals that want to be part of the
group, Pi i (P Pi i). The autonomous field agent f that
forms a group is commonly called ‘field officer’ by development agen-
cies. Self-financing groups are promoted by development agencies that
hire and pay an agent—the field officer—to create, train and supervise
a group; see Allen and Panetta (2010).
The criterion of a field officer f for selecting the members
= …x i m, 1, 2, ,i i , is to have more women than men in the group.
This positive gender discrimination is related to the fact that facilitating
agencies—which pay and instruct the field officer f —tend to target
women because they consider women to make a higher contribution to
family welfare, since women give priority to spending their earnings on
their children (GGuha & Guptauha & Gupta, 2005). Rasmussen (2012)
also attributes the gender focus of self-financing groups to women’s
economic resilience, since savings enable women to handle income
shocks and confront unforeseen emergencies such as illness or loss of
employment (Ghosh & Vinod, 2017).
Formally, when selecting the members …x x x{ , , , }m1 2 i from the
potential set of candidates P i, an artificial agent f wants to achieve a
gender ratio of women to men higher than τw ∈ (0,1],




Eq. (11) is computationally equivalent to a while loop. See the al-
gorithm in Box 2 below.
3.3. Algorithm 3: Agent-based simulation of self-financing groups and
formation of social capital
Algorithm 3 simulates the dynamics of savings accumulation as well
as the formation of social capital among the members of a self-financing
group. In the agent-based simulation, the emerging patterns of mem-
bers’ default and fund accumulation are the result of (i) the interactions
among members and (ii) an adaptive rule—a rule that changes the ru-
les—for savings accumulation, which is activated when a large number
of members do not contribute with their savings to the group.
In a self-financing group, each = …i m1, 2, , -member contributes a
amount of savings to a common fund during the life-cycle of the group
(Burlando & Canidio, 2017). This life-cycle is a round of meetings
… t1, 2, , where the members get together to contribute their quota of
savings to the common fund. In the ABS-SFG model, the number of
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meetings t is equal to the number of members m in a group, to account
for the fact that larger groups need longer organizational periods.
The number of members of a group (m) is not predetermined but is
rather an emergent parameter produced by the interactions of agents in
the model. The m number of members of the simulated groups is similar
to the number of members observed in real life: around 20 members.
Bisrat, Kostas, & Feng (2012) notes that SFGs have this number of
members because—although more members allow to accumulate a
larger sum of money over a cycle—too many members involve a greater
number of administrative problems, thus creating an incentive to keep
the number of participants to around 20 members.
A member of a self-financed group enters a state of default in savings
if the agent does not contribute his/her quota of savings during a
meeting t. In the model, this default state is modeled as an inequality
between the idiosyncratic probability of default d( )i s and the group-
level extrinsic probability of default d t( , )e s :
> +d d t u u( ) ( , ) , ~ (0, 1),i s e s (12)
where u is a random component from a uniform distribution (0, 1)
that models the unexpected events that can increase the probability of
default in savings.
The idiosyncratic probability of default d( )i s is a convex combi-
nation of each member’s intrinsic probability of default, related to age
(ai) and income (yi), and weighted by gender ( g):
= +d a y( ) ( ( ) (1 ) ( ))i s g d d i d d is s s s (13)
=
+
a( ) 1 1
1
d i
a a1 ( ( ) )
s
i
m i 2 1 (14)
=
+
y( ) 1 1
1d i y1s i (15)
where g 0,1 and d 0,1s are predetermined parameters, a( )d is is
the probability of default related to the age of an agent, and a( )d is is
the probability of default related to the income of an agent.
In Eq. (13), the parameter g 0,1 measures higher female repay-
ment rates when 1g , as reported in, for example, Mayoux (2000) or
Gonzales Martínez, Aguilera-Lizarazu, Rojas-Hosse, & Blanco (2019).
The probability of default related to the age of an agent a( )d is in Eq.
(14) is calculated using the inverse Euclidean distance from the cen-
troid of the age in the group. The parameter ds is the weight (the
importance) of age for the probability of default in savings. y( )d is is the
probability of default related to the income of an agent. Individuals
with low income, compared to the rest of the members, have a higher
probability of entering a state of default in savings. Likewise, in-
dividuals in the tails of the age distribution (young and older members)
have a higher probability of default, compared to other members.
Gender is included as an interaction term, assuming that women are
financially more reliable and thus have a lower probability of entering a
default state compared to men—see Abbink, Irlenbusch, & Renner
(2006) or D’espallier, Guérin, & Mersland (2011).
The extrinsic probability of default d t( , )e s depends on group-level
characteristics that arise from the interaction among members, the
amount of savings contribution and the stage of meetings in the life-


















In Eq. (16), is the individual amount of savings that each agent has to
contribute to the common fund. Higher amounts imply a higher burden
for the individuals and thus increase the probability of default. Para-
meter t is added to the default threshold ze to reflect the fact that the
probability of entering a default state increases over time. Conversely,
m reduces the probability of default in larger groups, because peer
pressure in such groups can act as a savings commitment device. For
example, Kast, Meier, & Pomeranz (2012) conducted a randomized trial
with microentrepreneurs in Chile and found that peers in savings
groups provide a mutual service by regularly holding each other ac-
countable for setting savings goals and regularly reminding each other
of these goals.
Agents that enter into a state of default in a meeting t 1 will also
affect the behavior of other agents in the next meeting t, because non-
defaulting agents that mimic the behavior of defaulting agents will fail
to deliver their quota of savings. This mimicking behavior is modeled in
Eq. (16) through a switching parameter ¬{ , }d d that changes when
agents enter a default state d in the group ( > ¬d d). The pre-
determined parameter of mimicking behavior increases the chances
that the rest of the non-defaulting members will enter a default state
when another member fails to deliver his/her quota of savings. Larger
values of imply that a defaulting agent can strongly interact and
dramatically affect the behavior of the rest of the agents in a self-fi-
nancing group.
The pattern of savings accumulation in the common fund (b) of the
self-financed group is defined by,
=
= =
b b m d d
m












m d u d
m







It is common in agent-based models to introduce adaptation, where
agents learn or adapt by changing their rules and behavior based on
their experience and dynamic interactions (Smith & Conrey, 2007). In
the case of a self-financing group, a high default rate in savings can
dramatically reduce the fund accumulated for loans. Thus, to com-
pensate for this reduction, an adaptive rule (‘a rule that changes the
rules’) is introduced in the agent-based model (Eq. (18)): groups with a
high default rate of savings ( >dm d
t ) change the pattern of
fund accumulation from a fixed scheme to a solidarity scheme, in
which non-defaulting members provide an additional con-
tribution— + u u(1 ), ~ (0, 1)—beyond the quota ( ) due at each
meeting t, in order to stabilize the collective savings fund bt over time.
See the algorithm in Box 3.
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The agent-based algorithm in Box 3 produces two outputs: debt
capital (k ) and social capital (ks). Debt capital is a fraction of the ac-
cumulated fund b and is discussed in Section 3.4. The formation of
social capital, in turn, is the result of the homophily among the parti-
cipants of a self-financing group.
The quantitative operationalization of social capital in the model is
based on the multilevel ecometric approach of Raudenbush & Sampson
(1999). This approach allows one to differentiate between individual
and area-level sources of variation in social capital (Mackenbach et al.,
2016). Formally, social capital is calculated as a function of the Eu-
clidean distance between individuals in an artificial community, in
terms of the homophily related to their age ( ai ), income ( yi ) and
household location ( hi ):
















































A multiplying gamma factor ( s) is included in the formula of social
capital of Eq. (19) to account for the impact of being part of a self-
financing group. The parameter s accounts for the fact that non-default
members of a self-financing group create additional bonds of trust,
trustworthiness and reciprocity. These resources, according to Putnam
(1993), promote their ability to undertake collective actions, such as
starting a joint business venture.
In the case of agents that are not part of a self-financing group, their
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social capital is a function of their own homophily (i.e., = 1s for
g ), while in the case of non-defaulting members of a self-finan-
cing group > 1s because the ratio of defaulting members to the total
members of a group is added to the scale parameter of social capital
(Eq. (20)). This implies that in a group with a large number of de-
faulting members (d), stronger social bonds of trust will be created
among the remaining non-defaulting members m d.
In Eq. (21), less social cohesion is assigned to individuals that are
not closer to the average age of the population (a), on the basis of
studies of reduced social capital in young and elderly populations
(Lauder, Mummery, & Sharkey, 2006). Lower social bonds are also al-
located to individuals that have an income in the tails of the distribu-
tion (Eq. (22)), since income inequality has been found to be related to
a reduction in social cohesion; see Khambule & Siswana (2017). Finally,
less contextual social capital is assigned to individuals that live in
households located in the village periphery (Eq. (23)). This last area-
level allocation of social capital is based on the literature on neigh-
borhood formation of social capital; see Butler & Robson (2001) and
Forrest & Kearns (2001).
3.4. Algorithm 4: Loan allocation and business simulation
Box 4 shows the last stage of the simulation (Algorithm 4). In the
last algorithm, agents start a joint business venture with the social ca-
pital and the debt capital obtained after being part of a self-financing
group. It is assumed that the group members start a business together;
this a direct result of homophily and tends to be common in low-income
groups of women, as those served by self-financing groups. See, for
example, the cases of informal businesses in Africa described in Spring
(2009).
The probability of members receiving a loan ( ) from the self-fi-





















1 1 , (24)
A member of the SFG will receive a loan if his/her probability of






( | , )
( ; )
i s post
r s m d,( ) (25)
In Eq. (25), r 0,1 is the ex-ante risk aversion of the SFG. This is the
risk aversion toward providing loans at the start of the group meetings.
This risk is updated by non-defaulting members after being part of a
SFG, on the basis of a Gompertz function of social capital (ks m d,( )),
=f k( ; ) .r s m d r,( ) r
r ks
m d( )
In the function f k( ; ),r s m d,( ) is the standard scientific notation
× 10m n, for which a mantissa and an order of magnitude of
= = 1m n generate a smoothed curve saturated toward the asymptote
r (Laird, 1964); this is, the social capital of the non-defaulting agents




f klim ( ; ) .
k
r s m d r,( )
s m d,( )
A value of 0.5 was chosen for the asymptotic risk-reduction probability
r (the hyperparameter = 0.5r ), based on Laplace’s uncertainty
principle: if no additional information about the reliability of the po-
tential borrowers is available, in the limit the SFG members assume that
all possible events are equiprobable; see inter alia Gurov (2005).
The amount of the loan allocated to the borrowers ( ) is a fraction of
the total savings in the common fund (b),
=k b r(1 ),post (26)
with an effective interest rate equal to the nominal interest rate plus the
updated (ex-post) risk aversion of the self-financing group,
= + r .post (27)
Eqs. (25)–(27) capture the pattern of loan provision and bucketization
of interest rates—as a function of risk aversion—that was observed
empirically by Paravisini, Rappoport, & Ravina (2016) in peer-to-peer
lending platforms. In the model, borrowers are jointly liable for the loan
, as joint liability makes borrowers responsible for repaying each
other’s debt, which encourages risk sharing among the members who
take a loan (Attanasio, Augsburg, & De Haas, 2016). As Chen et al.
(2017) highlight, this type of group lending lowers operating costs due
to diligence and monitoring, and therefore increases the likelihood of
loan repayment by shifting the bulk of monitoring costs from lenders to
groups.
The performance of the business created by the non-defaulting
members of the SFG and the counterfactual business of non-members is
calculated using the stochastic business model below:
= +debt (1 ) (28)
==inventory (1 )( 0)t (29)
=sales (inventory)t t (30)

















=ROA a( ¯ )returns.1 (34)
In the model, the total debt capital of the business is the result of adding
the amount of the loan borrowed by the SFG members plus the interest
rate charged for the loan (Eq. (28)). At the start of the business (at time
= 0t ), a fraction ( ) of the borrowed loan is set aside to buy retail
inventory (Eq. (29)). The inventory reduction is a function of market
sales (Eq. (30)),
= + + + +( )( ) ( )(1 ) ,k1 1 1 1s m d2 ,( ) (35)
which is boosted by the social capital of non-defaulting members
(ks m d,( )) but can be lessened by the macroeconomic environment—the
GDP growth—of a country ( ).
Eq. (31) is a mathematical description of a simple cash flow in the
business: income is obtained by sales at time t , minus the loan repay-
ment quota qt. The returns at the end of the period T (Eq. (32)) are the
sum of the cash flow minus random expenses related to unexpected
events ( e). Returns on assets (ROA)—more precisely, returns on
average assets—are obtained by dividing the business utility (Eq. (32))
by the average assets of the business (Eq. (33)). The formula of ROA in
Eq. (34) is based on the business-success indicators suggested by the
International Finance Corporation (2008) to evaluate micro, small and
medium enterprises.
The simplified businesses model simulated in Eqs. (28)–(34) is
motivated by Herranz, Krasa, & Villamil (2015), who found that risk-
averse entrepreneurs run smaller, more highly leveraged firms, which
default less because running a smaller firm with higher debt reduces the
number of personal funds at risk in the firm. In the model, a simplified
balance sheet is assumed where assets are an addition of the income
derived from sales plus the inventory and fixed assets acquired with the
loan. The liabilities of the business are only the loan repayments qt.
Fixed assets are assumed to depreciate to zero at the end of the life-
cycle of the business, and thus the utility at the end of the period is
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computed as the aggregate income from sales minus the total expenses
incurred in paying the capital and interest of the loan, along with the
expenses caused by unexpected (random) events.
Social capital enters the business model through improvements in
market allocation pushed forward by the social capital of the borrowers
in Eq. (30). Following Batjargal (2003), the heterogeneity in the
structural, relational, and resource-based aspects of social capital is
reflected in various aspects of business performance because embedded
relations influence the purchase and sale decisions of entrepreneurs.
Also, as noted by Ling-Yee (2004), social capital helps to integrate the
existing knowledge of members with the unique information from the
market . This in turn helps the group to update its knowledge, endow
it with meaning, and translate it into organizational routines.
The counterfactual business simulation of non-members is also
based on Eqs. (28)–(34). The ABS-SFG model (randomly) chooses
agents from the population of the village who were not part of the self-
financing group. The selected agents create a business under the same
financial conditions of the business created by the members of the self-
financing group, i.e. the same loan amount and interest rate. Using the
same financial conditions in both the self-financing business and the
business financed with formal loans allows us to isolate the financial
effects from the effects on business performance caused by social ca-
pital.
4. Results of computational experiments
This section runs = …1, 2, , simulations of the agent-based
model of self-financing groups. The index denotes running a single
sequence of the whole model (the four algorithms described in Section
3), and hence is the total number of simulations of the ABS-SFG
model. For example, when = = 1, only a single village, one self-
financing group, and one business are simulated—for an illustration of
this simulation see the Appendix A. If = 1000, then 1000 villages are
randomly populated and 1000 different groups and businesses are
generated in each village.
4.1. Counterfactual experiment of business performance
Tables 4 and 5 and Fig. 2 show the results of a counterfactual ex-
periment of business performance based on 1000 simulations of the
ABS-SFG model ( = … = ×1, 2, ,1000; 1 103). The experiment com-
pares the returns on assets (ROA , ) of 1000 businesses created by non-
defaulting members of 1000 self-financing groups against 1000 busi-
nesses created by non-members in 1000 artificial communities.
The experiment simulates the impact of annual loan interest rates
equal to 10% to 70% on ROA , ( … ={.1, , .7}, in Eq. (27))
for different values of savings contribution in self-financing groups.
The large values of the interest rates are based on the fact that bor-
rowers in self-financing groups typically pay interest rates of 5% to 10%
a month, according to Rasmussen (2012). Table 2 shows the numerical
values used to initialize the model. The main characteristics of the ex-
periments are summarized in Table 3.
When annual interest rates are below 40%, the profitability of the
businesses financed with loans from the self-financing groups is on
average higher compared to the profitability of businesses financed
with commercial loans (Table 4). When the savings quota is = MU30 ,
for example, the average return of the businesses in the self-financing
groups is 5.89%, while the average return of the businesses financed
with commercial loans is −3.31%. The risk of the businesses financed
with commercial loans is also higher, equal to 5.67%, compared to the
average risk of the businesses of the self-financing groups (4.25%).
For annual interest rates between 40% and 70% and for savings
contributions of = 30 and = 40, negative returns are observed both
for the businesses financed with commercial loans and for the business
financed with commercial loans from self-financing groups. The busi-
nesses in the self-financing groups have positive returns only for quotas
of savings equal to = 50 and = 60 (Table 5). For a savings quota of
= MU40 the average return of the businesses in the self-financing
groups is −3.29%, while the average return of the businesses financed
with commercial loans is −30.48%. If the savings quota rises to
= MU50 , the returns of the businesses in the self-financing groups
increases on average to 4.82%. This last result is the consequence of
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social capital in the self-financing group, which becomes important in
the presence of costly debt capital.
Fig. 2 reveals an emergent pattern in the dynamics of the returns of
businesses financed by self-financing groups: bifurcation. For values of
the savings quota equal to MU40 and MU50 , the businesses of the
members of self-financing groups tend to outperform the profitability of
the businesses of the non-members (Figs. 2a and 2b). When the savings
quota exceeds a threshold of = 60 (Fig. 2c), however, business per-
formance splits into two branches (Fig. 2d): in the lower bifurcation
branch, the businesses of self-financing groups have average returns of
−5.72% to 8.11%, while in the upper branch these businesses have
returns of 20.32% to 27.47%. The risk, measured by the standard de-
viation of the returns, is also low in the lower branch of the simulated
business of SFG members (Tables 4 and 5).
The bifurcation is caused by a quota of savings that exceeds a
threshold of tolerance and creates nonlinear dynamics in the business
profitability of self-financing groups. An extremely high quota of sav-
ings is a burden for agents with a restricted budget, which leads to
savings default. Savings default is imitated due to the interaction of
defaulting members with other group members, and as a consequence
the group ends up having only a small fund available for loans. A lower
amount of loans, in turn, leads to lower returns in the businesses cre-
ated by the non-defaulting members, which generates the lower bi-
furcation branch in returns.
On the other hand, if members of the self-financing group manage to
accommodate to the higher quota of savings and do not enter a default
state, then the other members mimic their fulfilling behavior and hence
at the end of the life-cycle of the group a larger fund is available for
loans. The higher amount of loans, added to the social capital formed
through homophily, boosts the profitability of the businesses created by
self-financing groups, thereby generating an upper branch in the bi-
furcation pattern.
5. Conclusion
Atlan (1979, 1991) develops two complementary concepts of com-
plexity: algorithmic complexity and contextual complexity. Algorithmic
complexity is based on optimization, whereas contextual complexity is
Fig. 2. Agent-based simulation of business performance. When < 60, the performance of the businesses of the members of self-financing groups is higher compared
to the performance of the businesses financed with commercial loans. After the bifurcation point ( > 60), in the lower bifurcation branch groups fail to generate
enough financial capital—because many members fail to contribute to the common fund—and their businesses perform worse than those of non-members. In the
upper bifurcation branch, members adapt to the high quota of savings and create additional social capital, boosting the performance of their business initiatives.
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based on the communication among heterogeneous agents with con-
flicting goals (Vasconcelos & Ramirez, 2011). In this study, self-finan-
cing groups are considered a phenomenon of contextual complexity and
an agent-based model is proposed to simulate how these groups form
and create businesses in an artificial community.
The results allow us to conclude that the startup businesses of self-
financing groups are more profitable and less risky compared to busi-
nesses financed with commercial loans, even with high interest rates,
when social capital is properly consolidated. The consolidation of social
capital is a consequence of the interaction among agents in the self-
financing group. Social capital complements the debt capital in the fund
available for loans, creating a competitive advantage that increases
business profitability.
Higher quotas of savings in the group were found to boost profit-
ability by raising the collective fund available for loans, but only up to a
threshold, after which a bifurcation in returns appears. This bifurca-
tion—typical in complexity dynamics (see Gao, Barzel, & Barabási,
2016)—is a branching process of the dynamical system in which the
topological structure switches to different states due to a change in a
bifurcation parameter (Crawford, 1991). In the ABS-SFG model, the
bifurcation parameter is the quota of savings agreed among members of
a self-financing group. The bifurcation implies that field officers—hired
by development agencies for the task of managing a group—face a
trade-off between two possible states when raising the savings quota of
a self-financing group: while the bifurcation parameter is a potential
source of profit, increasing the quota of savings exacerbates also the risk
of group failure.
The emerging findings of the study indicate that self-financing
groups create a competitive advantage for business, as a consequence of
the social capital formed in the group through homophily. Social ca-
pital, according to Lin, Ho, & Peng (2016), constitutes an additional
production factor that influences the competitive power and economic
development of a venture, because social capital is based on network
ties and thus it is a non-substitutable resource that cannot be acquired
Table 2
Numerical values used to initialize the ABS-SFG model.
Phase/algorithm Numerical values Notes on parameter values
Initialization
Algorithm 1: Generation of an artificial community
Family size = 2h Parameter of a centered Poisson distribution.
Intra-household productive individuals and
gender composition
u = 3 Upper parameter of a uniform integer discrete distribution. The lower parameter is always one
because there is always one productive individual in a productive household
Number of households in the village 64 Number of households in a village
Age profile in the village =u 20age Upper parameters of a mixture of discrete uniform distributions
Income profile in the village =¬µ 5.5w =µ 5.8w
=¬ 0.5w = 0.4w
First and second parameter of a log-normal distribution. Lower values of µ (compared to those
of men) imply that the central tendency of the income distribution of women is lower than that
of men. Higher values of imply that the income differences are more dispersed across
individuals
Algorithm 2: Formation of a self-financing group (SFG)
Overall probability of joining a SFG = .55i m( ) Weight (importance) of lack of access to financial services for the agents that want to be part
of the SFG
Gender ratio of women in the SFG = 0.7w Minimum percentage of women in a group required by the field officer
Running phase
Algorithm 3: SFG dynamics of savings accumulation and formation of social capital
Mimicking behavior = .007 Larger values increase the probability that non-defaulting members will enter a default state
when a member fails to deliver her/his quota of savings
Idiosyncratic probability of default in
savings
= 0.5ds Weight (importance) of income and age in the probability of not contributing with savings
Gender risk of not contributing to the SFG = 0.7g Women have less probability of failing to contribute their savings, compared to men
Threshold of SFG failure = 0.2d Maximum tolerance for the percentage of members failing to contribute their savings
Algorithm 4: Loan provision and business simulation
Risk aversion (ex ante) = 0.8r Initial (ex ante) risk aversion of the group against allocating loans. This risk aversion is
updated after the members experience being part of a SFG
Fraction of assets allocated to inventory = 0.65 Larger values imply that a higher proportion of the loan amount will be used to buy inventory
for retail sales
Impact of the macroeconomic environment = 0.05 Impact of economic growth on market sales. Larger (smaller) values will increase (decrease)
the business sales
Table 3
Main characteristics of the experiments.
Parameter Values
Nominal interest rate ( ) 10% to 70%
Savings quota ( ) 30, 40, 50, 60, 70
Table 4
Business simulation results: Loan interest rate in the range of 10% to 39.9%.
Savings quota Business impact ROA (%)
Members Non-members
= 30 Average returns 5.89 −3.31
Risk 4.25 5.67
= 40 Average returns 11.95 −3.17
Risk 3.43 5.65
= 50 Average returns 17.03 −0.18
Risk 2.83 5.24
= 60 Average returns 25.21 18.03
Risk 2.10 2.92
= 70 Average returns [27.47, 8.11] 21.35
Risk (2.16, 2.82) 2.61
Note: When > 60, a bifurcation pattern appears in returns.
ROA: returns on assets.
Average returns: average ROA in the 1000 simulations.
Risk: standard deviation of ROA in the 1000 simulations.
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through imperfect imitation3.
The theoretical implication of the findings is that homophily plays a
dual role in self-financing groups. Following a resource-view approach,
group formation is based on the maximization of utility by acquiring
more resources in the form of loans and/or social capital. In this study,
we argue that homophily plays a complementary role to utility max-
imization during the formation of a group. Homophily among members
consolidates social bonds and reduces risk aversion during the life-cycle
of a group. Social bonds translate into stronger cohesion, trust and peer
pressure among members, which reduces the chances of default and
facilitates organizational strategies4.
The study also has managerial implications for traditional compe-
tencies, networking and market appreciation5. First, in a business of a
self-financing group, traditional managerial competencies—such as fi-
nance, accounting, marketing, personnel management technologies,
organizational procedures and routines (Vasconcelos & Ramirez,
2011)—are necessary to manage internal issues, and coordinate, mo-
tivate and select priorities. Second, due to the networking nature of self-
financing groups, additional managerial competencies are required to
construct value co-production systems on the basis of the collaboration
and arrangements between members. Finally, through contextual
listening, businesses of self-financing groups are able to appreciate,
evaluate, question, and understand the general trends that compose the
transactional environment.
Future studies can explore the business impact of self-financing
groups that include a component of human capital besides social ca-
pital, as well as the role of friendship in business performance and the
potential competitive advantages of a transactive memory system in
self-financing groups6.
Self-financing groups improve human capital during the meetings of
the group by providing members with training in entrepreneurial skills
and financial literacy. Engström & McKelvie (2017), after analyzing a
dataset of 739 micro-enterprises in Ecuador, find that the impact of this
training leads to improved financial performance of micro-enterprises
in the informal economy. More recently Tsai & Yang (2018) found that
human capital, measured by education and experience, improves
vendor profit.
In the case of friendship, Batjargal (2003) finds that friendship ties
affect firm performance negatively, because friendship leaves little
room for maneuvering and creates financial concessions that harm a
business’s revenues and profit margins. While self-financing groups
often focus on individual ventures, a joint business creates a competi-
tive advantage for group members due to the combined effect of debt
capital and the social capital generated through a dual process of
homophily. Business training—which improves human capital—further
encourages the competitive advantage of joint businesses.
Development agencies who work with self-financing groups as a
platform to provide communities with sustainable development pro-
grams—like entrepreneurship, agriculture, adaptation to climate
change, health and sanitation, or programs of literacy, education, and
women empowerment—can use the ABS-SFG model as a cost-effective
virtual laboratory to perform artificial experiments. The impact of in-
tervention programs and social policies can be evaluated ex ante
through the artificial experiments in the virtual laboratories.
Investigations about the impact of business interventions are a pro-
mising research avenue, since Gonzales Martínez (2019) finds that
business training is not the most frequent intervention offered to self-
financing groups by development agencies, but is in fact the most im-
portant program to encourage financial sustainability, particularly after
a development agency leaves the community where a group operates7.
As shown in this study, agent-based modeling offers fascinating
opportunities to understand and explore phenomena through a set of
flexible computational tools. The simulations of agent-based models
inform decision-making and allow one to formulate theories, that can
guide empirical research and the interpretation of experimental
Table 5
Business simulation results: Loan interest rate in the range of 40% to 70%.
Savings quota Business impact ROA (%)
Members Non-members
= 30 Average returns -13.58 −30.76
Risk 7.44 11.01
= 40 Average returns -3.29 −30.48
Risk 5.65 10.95
= 50 Average returns 4.82 −25.29
Risk 4.42 10.03
= 60 Average returns 16.66 5.25
Risk 3.03 4.75
= 70 Average returns [20.32, −5.72] 10.84
Risk (2.67, 6.22) 3.90
Note: When > 60, a bifurcation pattern appears in returns.
ROA: returns on assets.
Average returns: average ROA in the 10000 simulations.
Risk: standard deviation of ROA in the 10000 simulations.
3 The findings on the importance of social capital are consistent with the
empirical study of Bosma, van Praag, Thurik, & de Wit (2004), who find that
investment in social capital enhances entrepreneurial performance of small
businesses in terms of survival, profits, and generated employment. Torres,
Marshall, & Sydnor (2018) show also that social capital increases revenues and
is a key asset for the long-term resilience of small businesses.
4 While Bosma et al. (2004) relate the impact of social capital on firm per-
formance to productivity and signaling, this study argues instead that the im-
pact of social capital on the performance of businesses in self-financing groups
is related to the cohesion created by homophily, which reduces organizational
conflict. Previous studies found that intra-organizational social capital has a
significant impact on the performance of new ventures (Baum, Calabrese, &
Silverman, 2000), because in business startups members are in unfamiliar roles
and face new work relationships during a time of stretched resources. Nahapiet
& Ghoshal (1998) further regard social capital as an organizational resource,
and Stinchcombe (2000) propose that the performance of a new firm is sig-
nificantly affected by the organizational conditions surrounding its founding.
As Vasconcelos & Ramirez (2011) highlight, complexity, in this view, is a
manageable dimension that can contribute to organizational learning.
5 According to Vasconcelos & Ramirez (2011), management copes with
complexity at three different levels: managerial competencies, networking and
contextual listening.
6 Self-financing groups can raise human and social capital through financial
literacy. Engström & McKelvie (2017) argue that financial literacy addresses an
individual’s ability to internally assess the benefits and costs of an en-
trepreneurial opportunity. As Nguimkeu (2014) highlights, entrepreneurship
requires not only financial capital but also human capital in the form of edu-
cation, experience, and skills to develop ventures—see Radhakrishnan (2015)
7 Gonzales Martínez (2019) provides large-sample empirical evidence of the
importance of business for self-financing groups, based on machine-learning
methods. Theoretically, self-financing groups can improve business perfor-
mance because these groups are a vehicle for the formation of a transactive
memory system, which consists of the knowledge stored in each individual’s
memory combined with a metamemory containing information regarding the
different teammates’ domains of expertise. Xu (2016)—building on Wegner
(1987), Uzzi (1997), Nadler, Thompson, & Boven (2003), Borgatti & Cross
(2003), and Argote, McEvily, & Reagans (2003)—indicates that strong re-
lationships help the members of a group to develop transactive memory systems
due to frequent interactions that facilitate reciprocal understandings of complex
problems and consequently ease the transfer of complex information because of
the norms of reciprocity and cooperation associated with social cohesion. As Xu
(2016) concludes, this cognitive orientation influences how entrepreneurs de-
velop a business plan, plan for a business operation, obtain funding to begin
product/service development, and launch their startup.
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evidence (Chávez-Juárez, 2017). In contrast to results estimated from
observational data, the findings in agent-based models emerge from the
interactions among heterogeneous agents in artificial worlds (Gilbert &
Troitzsch, 2005); thus—as noted by Vermeulen & Pyka (2017) and Pyka
et al. (2018)—agent-based modeling is a platform to experiment with
complexity in a microverse of simulated realities.
Appendix A. Illustration of the dynamics of the ABS-SFG model with one single simulation
This appendix illustrates the dynamics of the ABS-SFG model by showing the results of running only one simulation. Fig. A1 shows the results of
simulating one artificial community with =H 64 households. Each box represents a household. Blue squares in the households are productive men,
red triangles are women, and black dots are the dependents in the household (children and non-working elderly populations). The parameter H
calibrates the number of households in a community.
In some households there is only one woman or man and one dependent agent, while in other households there is more than one agent of the
working population and also several dependents (Fig. A1). In the simulated community, there is a total of 364 individuals, 175 of which are men and
189 are women (the gender ratio is.93). In the village, 232 individuals are dependents agents and 132 are agents of the labor force.
Fig. A1 (left) also shows the distributions of age and income in the artificial village. The distribution of income is skewed—a common feature of
income distributions—with a bulk of individuals in the average income and some individuals with high income in the right tail of the distribution.
The income distribution of men is set higher compared to that of women, in order to simulate gender disparities in income commonly found in
empirical studies. Fig. A1 (left) shows also that the average age in the population is 43 years, with some individuals having less than 20 years and
others having close to 70 years. The age dependency ratio is 1.76 in the simulated community, reflecting the fact that the community has more
dependents than workers.
The number of members of a self-financing group is an emergent parameter of the agent-based model. In a single simulation for = 40 with a
fixed seed (Fig. A2), a group of 18 members is created by an artificial field agent. In the group, 15 agents are women and 3 are men, indicating the
preference of the field agent for women. The members of the group selected by the field agent yield a gender composition of the self-financing group
equal to = 15/18 83% of women.
In terms of group dynamics, Fig. A2b shows that in the fourth meeting a member of the group (a man) fails to contribute his quota of savings. Due
to the mimicking behavior of agents, other members of the self-financing group also start to fail to contribute to the common fund by the middle of
the life-cycle of the group (Fig. A2c). By the end of the life-cycle of the group—in the last meeting—only 9 members—7 women and 2 men—have not
failed to contribute to the common fund of the self-financing group (Fig. A2d).
Table A1 and Fig. A3 show the impact of changing the amount of savings quota that each member has to contribute to the self-financing group.
When the members of the group contribute an individual quota of 30 monetary units (MUs), = MU30 , there is no default since no member fails to
contribute to the fund (Fig. A3a). For a quota of = MU40 , half of the members in the group fail to contribute to the fund (Fig. A3b). When the quota
is = MU50 , 15 members fail to contribute to the fund (Fig. A3c) and and when the quota is = MU60 the individual savings contribution is too
Fig. A1. Simulation of a community of H = 64 households. Each box represents a household. The households are inhabited by men (blue squares) women (red
triangles) and children and non-working elderly populations (black dots). H can be modified to simulate smaller villages with few households or larger villages. Due
to the random creation of villages, different simulations produce different household compositions. The high proportion of low-income individuals in the village and
the gender disparities related to a higher income inequality for women can be seen in the left-skewed distributions of income in the village (Fig. A1 left). The
distribution of age indicates a concentration of the population between 30 and 50 years, but with a high number of dependents compared to the labor force
population, as shown in the demographic indicators below: Population: 364 individuals, Men in the community: 175, Women in the community: 189, Gender ratio:
0.93, Dependents in the community: 232, Labor force (productive population): 132, Income distribution of the agents in the community., Men income (median):
328.67 mu, Women income (median): 243.42 mu, Age distribution of the agents in the community., Average age of the productive pop: 43, Age dependency ratio:
1.76.
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high and all of the members fail to contribute, leading to the failure of the group (Fig. A3d).
The simulations of the impact of show that higher quotas of savings can increase the common loan fund, up to a point beyond which raising the
quota starts to reduce the common fund. An extremely high quota of savings causes members to default, which eventually decreases the fund
available for startup loans. The number of defaulting members is related both to the individual circumstances of each agent and also to the
Fig. A2. Agent-based simulation: one single self-financed group, savings quota = 40. All the members contribute their savings to the common fund in the first
meeting of the group. A male agent fails to contribute from his savings in the fourth meeting, and due to the mimicking behavior of other agents, 9 of the 18 original
members of the group end up failing to contribute their savings to the common fund of the self-financing group.
Table A1
Results of the agent-based simulation on group dynamics.
Savings quota
= 30 = 40 = 50 = 60
Total amount collected in the fund (MU) 9720 8520 5784 4961
Number of default members 0 9 15 18
Non-default members (end of the cycle) 18 9 3 0
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interaction among agents. At the individual level, an extremely high quota of savings creates a heavy burden for the members of the self-financing
group, due to household budget constraints. At the group level, due to a mimicking behavior and the stochastic interaction among agents (Kirman,
2010), agents have fewer incentives to contribute to the common fund if they observe that other agents are failing to contribute to the fund.
Finally, Fig. A4 shows the social bonds of the agents before and after joining the self-financing group, for a quota of = MU40 . Homophily—due
to age, income, and household location—generates links among agents that increase the social capital in the group. The growth of social capital in
the self-financing group is caused by the fact that during the life-cycle of the group, agents repeatedly meet with each other, strengthening their
bonds. This is particularly true for those members that already had a tight social network before joining the group; for example, the female agents 16
and 15, and to a lesser extent the male member 7; see Fig. A4). Fig. A4 also reveals the inequality in social capital that the model aims to capture; i.e.,
agents have heterogeneous levels of social capital depending on their socioeconomic and geographical characteristics, as noted by Hsung et al.
(2017).
Fig. A3. Agent-based simulation of a self-financing group with different values of savings quota ( ). Low values of the individual savings contribution ( = 30) are
not a burden for members of self-financing groups, but when the savings contribution increases to = 60, members start to fail to contribute to the common fund, due
to household budget constraints and the mimicking behavior of agents.
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